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The Liberal Legacy of Bush v. Gore
DAVID COLE*
INTRODUCTION
Few cases in the Supreme Court’s 200-plus year history have more deeply
tested its institutional legitimacy than Bush v. Gore.1 In that historic decision,
the Supreme Court intervened in the most closely contested presidential election
of all time—a virtual dead heat—and essentially called the election by blocking
a recount of votes in Florida. As a result, victory went to George W. Bush, who
had lost the popular vote but, by virtue of his exceedingly narrow and hotly
disputed victory before recount in Florida, had managed to eke out an Electoral
College majority.
Volumes have been written about the Bush v. Gore decision—most, although
not all, of it critical of the Court’s intervention. The criticism was not limited to
the pages of law reviews but extended to the popular press, and, no doubt, to
water cooler conversations across the country. Few cases in the Court’s history
have likely raised more substantial questions about the line between law and
politics in the Court’s decisionmaking.
In this Article, I move beyond the debate about Bush v. Gore itself and look
instead at its aftermath. My claim is that since the decision, the Court has
apparently been on a campaign to rehabilitate itself—to repair its image as an
institution guided by law and constitutional principle rather than partisan poli-
tics. One sign of this campaign is that the Justices have been increasingly
willing to cross traditional voting lines in cases that capture the public’s
attention. Moreover, it appears that, at least in the most controversial cases,
conservatives (those held responsible for the result in Bush v. Gore) have more
often sided with liberal Justices to reach liberal results than vice versa. In
addition, at least some post-Bush v. Gore decisions seem to reflect a renewed
emphasis on the rule of law—namely, on that which distinguishes the realm of
law from the realm of politics. If so, that development could not be more timely,
because some of the most important constitutional issues for the foreseeable
future are likely to involve claims of unchecked presidential power in the “war
on terror.” In this respect, at least, Bush v. Gore may have had a silver lining.
More broadly, the Court’s own reaction to Bush v. Gore demonstrates the
checking power of popular perceptions of the Court’s legitimacy. Because the
Court’s power depends almost entirely on its public legitimacy, decisions that
call that legitimacy into question may inevitably trigger a correction. Some have
suggested that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts were a corrective to the
perceived excesses of the Warren Court. This Article suggests that the last years
* Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. © 2006, David Cole. My research assistants, Brian
Baak and Marian Fowler, provided invaluable assistance in preparing this Article.
1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
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of the Rehnquist Court saw a self-correction in the other direction. Whether the
correction will continue with the Roberts Court remains to be seen, but the
apparent reaction of a fundamentally conservative Court to criticism of Bush v.
Gore suggests that “We the People” may have something to say about it.
I will first show in Part I that the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore
raised serious questions about the Court’s legitimacy. Reaction in the main-
stream press and the academy was overwhelmingly negative, and polls showed
that large percentages of the populace felt that the Justices’ votes were influ-
enced by their partisan political preferences. Such a reaction constitutes a major
threat to the institutional standing, and ultimately to the power, of the Court.
Part II demonstrates that, in the decision’s wake, at least some of the conserva-
tive Justices may have taken this criticism to heart. Qualitative and quantitative
analyses show that the Rehnquist Court was more likely to reach liberal results
in the four years after Bush v. Gore than in the corresponding period preceding
the decision. Part III suggests that the criticism of Bush v. Gore may also have
sparked renewed emphasis on the rule of law, because it is precisely the rule of
law, and the Court’s role in maintaining it, that legitimates the Court’s authority
in our democracy. The Article concludes with an argument that such judicial
reaction to popular perceptions of the Court’s legitimacy is appropriate and
necessary. Perceptions about whether the Court is acting “like a Court” play an
important checking function on the Court’s power to “say what the law is.”
I. BUSH V. GORE—THE INITIAL REACTION
The contentiousness of the 2000 post-election battle between George W.
Bush and Al Gore meant that any Supreme Court intervention would likely be
controversial, no matter how it resolved the matter. With the fate of the
presidency at stake, every move by every actor in the wake of the election
seemed tainted by partisan politics. One expects partisanship from the candi-
dates, their legal teams, and their political parties. But the Supreme Court’s
legitimacy rests largely on its perceived nonpartisanship; the Court, like constitu-
tional law, is supposed to be above everyday politics, guided by deeper prin-
ciples than mere political advantage. Thus, any involvement by the Court risked
tainting the institution with the brush of partisanship.
The way the Court reached its decision only made matters worse. The vote
was, for all intents and purposes, along party lines. The five Justices who likely
would have voted for Bush—Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thom-
as—formed a majority in favor of blocking the recount.2 The four Justices who
likely would have voted for Gore—Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg—
were in dissent.3 The Justices’ reasoning further reinforced the sense that, in this
2. See id. at 100 (per curiam); id. at 111 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia & Thomas, JJ.,
concurring).
3. See id. at 123–58 (Stevens, Souter, Breyer, & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). Justices Souter and
Breyer agreed that the way Florida was proceeding with the recount violated the Equal Protection
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case, the result drove the reasoning and not vice versa. In voting along partisan
lines, all of the Justices acted against type and employed reasoning contrary to
their own stated judicial philosophies and constitutional commitments. The
conservative Justices in the majority—who generally criticize judicial activism,
prize state autonomy, and take a dim view of new constitutional rights—
aggressively intervened not once but twice in a state electoral process and
ultimately found that Florida’s plan to conduct a manual recount had violated a
novel one-time-only equal protection right,4 despite the fact that manual re-
counts had occurred repeatedly in the past without any suggestion that they
violated equal protection. In reaching this decision, moreover, the majority
announced that it would not be bound in future cases by any principles
announced therein,5 thus overtly discarding one of the principal constraints on
judicial decisionmaking—the obligation to follow one’s own precedents in
future cases. At the same time, the dissenting Justices—who tend to favor
individual rights over states’ rights—criticized the majority for judicial activ-
ism, for interfering with state autonomy, and ultimately for undermining confi-
dence in the judge as “an impartial guardian of the rule of law.”6
That so many Justices were willing to act so deeply against type, and that
each ended up supporting the result that they would have preferred as a political
matter, prompted many to question the legitimacy of the institution. Reaction
was swift and remarkably negative. Given that the nation was almost evenly
divided on the outcome of the election, one might suppose that reaction to the
Court’s decision would be similarly divided—with the half of the nation that
supported Bush praising the decision as a brilliant and necessary intervention,
and the half that supported Gore condemning it as a partisan power grab by the
Republican Justices. Yet the reaction was in fact overwhelmingly critical of the
Court.7
A review of unsigned editorials and op-eds published in the country’s top
twenty newspapers by circulation in the week following the decision, for
example, finds eighteen unsigned editorials critical of the decision and only six
praising it.8 Signed op-eds in the same newspapers were also overwhelmingly
Clause but dissented from the majority’s decision to halt the recount altogether. See id. at 144–46
(Breyer, J., joined by Souter, J., dissenting). They would have remanded to Florida for a recount under
uniform standards. Id. at 146. Thus, on the decisive issue of whether the recount should go forward or
not, the vote was 5-4.
4. See id. at 103 (per curiam) (holding that the “standardless” manual recount violates the Equal
Protection Clause).
5. See id. at 109.
6. See id. at 129 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (criticizing the majority
for undermining “the Nation’s confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law”); id.
at 141 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Stevens, J., and joined in part by Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for intruding on a state’s prerogative to “organize itself as it sees fit”); id. at
158 (Breyer, J., joined in part by Stevens, Ginsburg, & Souter, JJ., dissenting) (criticizing the majority
for a lack of “self-restraint”).
7. See infra Addenda A, B, & C (illustrating the critical reaction in newspapers and academia).
8. See infra Addendum A.
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critical, with twenty-six critical op-eds and only eight defending the decision.9
Law review commentary, a rough guide for the academy’s assessment of the
decision, was also predominantly critical. Of seventy-eight articles that have
discussed Bush v. Gore between 2001 and 2004, thirty-five criticized the
decision, and only eleven defended it.10 Some 625 professors signed a letter
shortly after the decision expressing their dismay at the Court’s failure to abide
by the rule of law.11
Public polls also reflected serious questions about the Court’s legitimacy
among a large segment of the population. Polls taken around the time of the
decision found between 37% and 65% of respondents thought that the Justices’
personal politics influenced their decision.12 One poll reported that 46% of
respondents said that the decision made them more likely to suspect that
Supreme Court Justices have a partisan bias.13 Another found that 53% of
respondents felt the Court’s decision to stop the recount was based mostly on
politics.14 In short, Bush v. Gore led the press, the academy, and the public to
question the Court’s legitimacy as an institution guided by principle rather than
politics.
II. THE AFTERMATH—THE LIBERAL LEGACY OF A CONSERVATIVE DECISION
Whether or not one agrees with the substance of the criticism of the Court
outlined above—and I presume that at least the five Justices in the Bush v. Gore
majority did not agree with it—the mere existence of the criticism is a serious
problem for an institution whose authority depends largely on perceptions of its
legitimacy. As an unelected body in a democratic polity, without the means to
enforce its own judgments, the judiciary more than any other branch of govern-
ment must rely on the authority of legitimacy. And its legitimacy, in turn, rests
on the perception that it is not simply a political institution, but that it is guided
by constitutional principle and law that rises above—and constrains—everyday
partisan political decisionmaking. The Court is at its most vulnerable where it is
seen as deciding cases without a basis in constitutional principle because then
9. See infra Addendum B.
10. See infra Addendum C.
11. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Legal Historicism and Legal Academics: The Roles of
Law Professors in the Wake of Bush v. Gore, 90 GEO. L.J. 173, 188 n.62 (reproducing letter).
12. See, e.g., CBS News Poll (Dec. 17, 2000), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2000/12/17/opinion/
main257905.shtml (finding that 37% of voters thought the decision was based more on partisan politics
than on objective interpretation of the law); CNN/Gallup/USA Today Poll (Dec. 15–17, 2000),
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/12/18/cnn.poll/ (finding that 50% of voters thought
the decision influenced by political views); Harris Poll (Dec. 14–21, 2000), http://www.pollingreport.com/
wh2post.htm (finding that 41% of voters believed the decision mainly reflected Justices’ political
views); Princeton Survey Research Associates Poll (Dec. 14–15, 2000), http://www.pollingreport.com/
wh2post.htm (finding that 65% of voters thought partisanship or politics played a major role or some
role in Court’s decision).
13. Princeton Survey Research Associates Poll, supra note 12.
14. NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll (Dec. 10, 2000), http://www.pollingreport.com/wh2post.htm.
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there appears to be little to differentiate it from the political branches. And if the
Court cannot be distinguished from the political branches, it loses its authority
to decide; if decisions are politically driven, why shouldn’t they be decided in a
democracy by officials accountable to the people through elections?
Accordingly, the Court’s most precious commodity is its own legitimacy.
Bush v. Gore called that legitimacy deeply into question. The Court’s record
since then suggests that the Justices may realize this and, consciously or
subconsciously, have sought to rehabilitate the Court’s image by reducing
partisan division, correcting to some extent the Court’s considerably conserva-
tive tilt, and emphasizing the importance of a rule of law that is distinct from
and rises above politics. The desire to reduce perceptions of partisanship would
not necessarily favor liberal or conservative results. Such perceptions could be
offset as much by liberals supporting conservative results as vice versa. In fact,
however, liberals more frequently seem to have been the beneficiaries of the
reaction. Since Bush v. Gore, the Court’s rulings in prominent cases have been
markedly less “partisan,” and conservative Justices have sided with their more
liberal counterparts to reach liberal results more often than have liberal Justices
sided with conservatives to support a conservative result.15
The four decisions from the 2003 Term that prompted this Symposium—
Blakely v. Washington,16 Crawford v. Washington,17 Rasul v. Bush,18 and Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld19—fit this pattern. In all four cases, conservative Justices joined
with their more liberal colleagues to rule against the Bush Administration and in
favor of criminals or alleged terrorists. In Crawford, Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas joined forces with Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg
to affirm the right of criminal defendants under the Sixth Amendment’s Confron-
tation Clause to confront the evidence used against them by barring introduction
of taped statements where the defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine
the witness.20 In Blakely, Justices Scalia and Thomas joined Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg to form a majority, while Justice Breyer sided with Chief
15. For purposes of this Article, I break down the Rehnquist Court by describing Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas as “conservative” and Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer as “liberal.” These terms are obviously crude and ignore
important differences between the Justices. They are also relative. None of the “liberal” Justices is as
liberal as, say, Justices Warren, Brennan, or Thurgood Marshall. And on the “conservative” side,
Justices Scalia and Thomas are much more radical conservatives than Justices Kennedy and O’Connor,
and Chief Justice Rehnquist was generally closer to Justices Scalia and Thomas than to Justices
Kennedy and O’Connor. Nonetheless, for purposes of assessing broad trends in reaction to Bush v.
Gore, I have characterized the majority in that case as conservative and the dissent as liberal.
16. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
17. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
18. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
19. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
20. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69 (holding that a defendant must be afforded the opportunity to
cross-examine testimonial statements under the Sixth Amendment). But see id. at 69–76 (Rehnquist,
C.J., joined by O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (concurring in the holding but dissenting
sharply from the majority’s reasoning).
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Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Kennedy in dissent.21 The major-
ity held that Washington’s sentencing guidelines scheme violated the defen-
dant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by permitting his sentence to be
increased over the statutory maximum on the basis of facts not found by the
jury or admitted by the defendant.22
Neither Crawford nor Blakely came as a complete surprise and, as one
contributor to this Symposium shows, were arguably forecast by prior decisions
in the area.23 But although these decisions may be explained as extensions of
pre-Bush v. Gore cases, that claim cannot be made with respect to the enemy
combatant decisions. In Rasul v. Bush, Justices Kennedy and O’Connor joined
their more liberal colleagues to hold that foreign nationals detained at Guan-
tanamo Bay, Cuba, as “enemy combatants” had a right to seek habeas corpus
relief challenging the legality of their detention.24 And in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
eight members of the Court rejected the President’s claim that he could detain a
U.S. citizen as an “enemy combatant” without any hearing whatsoever.25 Justice
O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer,
reasoned that due process demanded that such a detainee be afforded notice of
the charges and a “meaningful opportunity” to rebut them before a neutral
decisionmaker.26 Justices Souter and Ginsburg concurred in that result, although
they would have gone further, holding that the Non-Detention Act barred
Hamdi’s detention.27 Justices Scalia and Stevens dissented, maintaining that
under the Constitution, the government has only two options when confronted
with a citizen that it alleges is fighting for the enemy in a military conflict—to
try him in the criminal justice system for treason or to ask Congress to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus.28 Only Justice Thomas adopted the government’s
argument that it could hold Hamdi indefinitely without a hearing.29
The decisions that sparked this Symposium are noteworthy from four vantage
points. First, the Rehnquist Court was not known for being sympathetic to
21. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 297 (majority opinion by Scalia, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, Thomas,
& Ginsburg, JJ.); id. at 314 (O’Connor, J., joined by Breyer, J., and joined in part by Rehnquist, C.J.,
and Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 326 (Kennedy, J., joined by Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 328 (Breyer
J., joined by O’Connor, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 313–14 (majority opinion).
23. See Joseph E. Kennedy, Cautious Liberalism, 94 GEO. L.J. 1537, 1551–54 (2006).
24. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004) (Stevens, J., joined by O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg,
& Breyer, JJ.) (holding that federal courts may determine whether foreign nationals may be indefinitely
detained); id. at 485 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
25. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (plurality) (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J., Kennedy & Breyer, JJ.).
26. Id.
27. See id. at 541 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that, absent the government raising further claims, the Non-
Detention Act requires Hamdi’s release).
28. See id. at 554 (Scalia, J., joined by Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that the President’s claim of
military necessity does not permit detention without charge).
29. See id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that indefinite detention “falls squarely” within
the Executive Branch’s war powers).
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criminal defendants—much less suspected terrorists—yet in all of these cases it
ruled in favor of alleged criminals and terrorists. Second, the Supreme Court
has historically been extremely deferential to executive claims of national
security in times of crisis, yet in the enemy combatant cases the Court resound-
ingly rejected President Bush’s arguments for deference. Third, none of the
decisions was decided by the traditional conservative-liberal divide.
The most important point, however, is that while these cases may seem
aberrational—indeed, that perception is what prompted this Symposium—they
are not. Since Bush v. Gore, many of the Court’s most prominent and conten-
tious cases have been decided by a majority comprised largely of liberal
Justices, with one or more conservatives signing on to make up the majority. It
is as if, having consolidated their power by ensuring that President Bush won
the 2000 election, the conservative Justices felt more free, or, as I will argue,
more obliged, to side with liberal Justices. The trend is particularly evident in
prominent cases, suggesting that the Justices may, again perhaps subcon-
sciously, recognize that the cases the public notices have the most impact on
perceptions of the Court and therefore on its legitimacy.
As illustrated below, over the course of the four Supreme Court Terms that
followed Bush v. Gore, the Court dealt substantial setbacks to a host of popular
conservative causes, as conservative Justices joined the liberal dissenters in
Bush v. Gore to reach liberal outcomes. The Court upheld affirmative action in
university admissions,30 declared unconstitutional a statute criminalizing homo-
sexual sodomy,31 reined in the “federalism” revolution,32 frustrated the property
rights movement,33 expanded criminal defendants’ rights and civil rights vic-
tims’ remedies,34 and upheld a campaign finance law opposed by many conserva-
tives.35 The Court’s record is not, of course, one-sided. During the same period,
it also relaxed restrictions on government aid to religious schools,36 rejected
challenges to “three-strikes” statutes imposing life imprisonment for relatively
minor repeat offenses,37 and upheld mandatory detention of foreign nationals in
30. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
31. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
32. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (allowing the states to be sued when fundamental
access to the courts is prevented); Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003)
(allowing Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity with the Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2000))).
33. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (affirming the use of eminent domain
for economic development); Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003) (holding the
collection of interest on lawyers’ trust accounts to fund free legal services is not a taking).
34. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005) (holding that age discrimination suits can
proceed on a showing of disparate impact); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that
the Confrontation Clause guarantees to criminal defendants the right to cross-examine all testimonial
evidence).
35. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
36. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
37. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
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deportation proceedings for a prior criminal conviction.38 On the whole, though,
the post-Bush v. Gore Court’s record is remarkably liberal for a conservative
Court.39
Each of the four Terms after Bush v. Gore provided significant examples of
this “liberalizing” trend. In the 2001 Term, the Court declared the death penalty
for the mentally retarded unconstitutional, with Justices Kennedy and O’Connor
joining the liberal Justices,40 and invalidated death sentences imposed on the
basis of facts not found by a jury, with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy
joining their more liberal brethren.41 Justice O’Connor sided with the liberals to
extend the right to lawyers for the poor to cases in which only a suspended
sentence is imposed.42 By a 7-2 margin, over the dissents of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, the Court held invalid the Child Pornography
Prevention Act, which made it a crime to create, disseminate, or possess
“virtual” child pornography constructed from computer images rather than
actual children.43 The Court also dealt a setback to a favorite conservative
cause—the use of the takings clause to restrict government regulation of private
property. In Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy joined the liberal Justices to rule that
even an extended moratorium on development of private property did not
constitute a “taking” requiring just compensation.44
In the 2002 Term, only five of fourteen 5-4 decisions that Term were decided
by the conservative bloc that decided Bush v. Gore.45 In its final week, the Court
upheld affirmative action in university admissions, with Justice O’Connor
38. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
39. At the time of this writing, there were only four completed Supreme Court Terms since Bush v.
Gore was decided. Moreover, with the appointments of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, the
Rehnquist Court is no longer. I have accordingly compared the four Terms after Bush v. Gore to the four
Terms that preceded it. Because Bush v. Gore itself was handed down in the middle of the 1999 Term, I
have not included that Term in the analysis. Many of the cases decided that Term were argued and
effectively decided before the decision in Bush v. Gore was issued, while others were argued and
decided in the immediate aftermath of the decision. In addition, as the opinions in Bush v. Gore itself
attest, passions ran high at the Court that Term. Given that fact, and the difficulty of dividing up the
Term, I restricted my analysis to the four complete Terms before and after the 1999 Term.
40. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
41. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
42. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002).
43. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002).
44. 535 U.S. 302, 336–37 (2002) (declining to adopt a per se rule that the moratoria constitute
takings).
45. The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—The Statistics, 117 HARV. L. REV. 480, 485 (2003). Justices
Scalia and Thomas were the most frequent dissenters in nonunanimous cases, perhaps reflecting their
judgment that the Court was veering too far to the left. See id. at 480 (showing that Justice Scalia
dissented ten times, and Justice Thomas dissented thirteen times). In prior Terms, Justice Stevens had
generally been the most frequent dissenter. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2001 Term—The Statistics,
116 HARV. L. REV. 453, 435 (2002) (showing that Justice Stevens dissented fourteen times, followed by
Justice Scalia with ten dissents). One should not make too much of these particular statistics, as they
may be outliers. In the 2004 Term, for example, Justice Stevens was back on top, dissenting thirteen
times, while Justice Scalia dissented only seven times. The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—The Statistics,
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joining the liberal Justices,46 and struck down a Texas statute that criminalized
gay sodomy.47 In the Texas sodomy case, the majority, consisting of Justice
Kennedy and the liberal Justices, concluded that the statute violated the due
process rights of consenting adults to engage in private sexual conduct,48 while
Justice O’Connor concurred, reasoning that the prohibition of homosexual but
not heterosexual sodomy denied equal protection.49 The same Term, the Court
dramatically departed from what had been a solid record of conservative bloc
voting on the question of state immunity from suits for damages under the
Eleventh Amendment.50 In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,
the Court ruled that states could be sued for damages for violating the Family
Medical Leave Act.51 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion, on behalf of
himself, the liberal Justices, and Justice O’Connor.
In addition to these “blockbuster” cases, the Court in the 2002 Term also
upheld a Washington program for funding indigent legal services by garnering
interest on lawyers’ trust accounts, dealing another blow to the conservative
property-rights movement.52 Justice O’Connor joined the liberals to make up
the majority, holding that the program did not constitute an impermissible
taking of a client’s private property. And in Wiggins v. Smith, the Court found
ineffective assistance of counsel in a criminal case for only the second time
119 HARV. L. REV. 415, 420 (2005). But as discussed infra, the 2004 Term was at least as liberal in its
results as the 2002 Term, if not more so.
46. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (upholding The University of Michigan Law
School’s affirmative action admissions policy). Although the Court struck down Michigan’s undergradu-
ate admissions affirmative action policy as too rigid in this same Term, see Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
244 (2003), it made clear in Grutter that as long as race was considered as a plus factor in an
individualized review of applications, as opposed to a formulaic or mechanical consideration of race,
affirmative action could continue in university admissions. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337 (“[T]he Law
School engages in a highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s file, giving serious
consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment . . . .
Unlike the program at issue in Gratz, the Law School awards no mechanical, predetermined diversity
‘bonuses’ based on race or ethnicity.”); see also Gratz, 539 U.S. at 244.
47. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
48. See id.
49. See id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
50. The Court had previously held that states could not be sued for damages for violating a host of
federal statutes, including the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
the Americans with Disabilities Act, and even federal patent and copyright laws. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000) (holding that states may not be sued for damages for violating
Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that states
may not be sued in state courts for violating Fair Labor Standards Act); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 691 (1999) (holding that states may not be sued for
damages for violating trademark law); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav.
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999) (holding that states may not be sued for damages for infringing
patents); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding that states may not be sued
for damages for violating laws enacted under Congress’s Commerce Clause power).
51. See 538 U.S. 721, 726–34 (2003) (holding that the statute was a proper exercise of Congress’s
authority to enforce equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment).
52. See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 240 (2003).
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since it announced a right to effective assistance of counsel in 1984.53 In
Wiggins, which overturned a death sentence, only Justices Scalia and Thomas
dissented.
The conservative majority carried the day in other cases, including two
decisions rejecting Eighth Amendment challenges to California’s “three-strikes”
law54 and a case upholding mandatory detention of foreign nationals placed in
deportation proceedings on the basis of prior criminal convictions.55 But these
were exceptions to the rule, at least in those cases that drew national attention.
Much more often than not, in such cases the Court departed from the conserva-
tive-liberal divide of Bush v. Gore.
The 2003 Term, the immediate catalyst for this Symposium, continued this
trend, so much so that the New York Times’s Supreme Court reporter Linda
Greenhouse captioned it “The Year Rehnquist May Have Lost his Court.”56 In
addition to the decisions discussed above in Blakely, Crawford, Hamdi, and
Rasul, the Court’s liberals were in the majority on several other prominent
cases. Justice O’Connor joined the liberals to uphold in large measure the
McCain-Feingold campaign finance law,57 and she also provided the decisive
votes in two cases further curtailing the federalism revolution. The first, Tennes-
see v. Lane, held that under the Americans with Disabilities Act,58 states could
be sued in cases implicating the “fundamental right of access to the courts.”59
The second, Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, upheld the EPA’s authority to impose stricter air quality
conditions on a mine than state regulators had imposed,60 over a spirited dissent
resting on federalism grounds.61 In another prominent and potentially partisan
case, Justice Kennedy joined the liberals to forestall a conservative effort to
jettison all constitutional limits on partisan gerrymanders.62
Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Stevens
53. See 539 U.S. 510, 538 (2003).
54. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003) (upholding a sentence imposed under a
three-strikes law as “not [an] unreasonable application of clearly established law” under the Antiterror-
ism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40, and 42 U.S.C.)); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11,
30–31 (2003) (finding that a sentence imposed under a three-strikes law did not violate the defendant’s
Eighth Amendment protection).
55. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003) (holding that an alien convicted of burglary and
petty theft may be mandatorily “detained for the brief period necessary for [his] removal proceedings”).
56. Linda Greenhouse, The Year Rehnquist May Have Lost his Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2004, at
A1.
57. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 245 (2003) (affirming the validity of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified in
scattered sections of 2 and 47 U.S.C.)).
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000).
59. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004).
60. See 540 U.S. 461, 469 (2004).
61. See id. at 502–03 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
62. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
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to rule that the Child Online Protection Act of 1998,63 which sought to limit
children’s access to internet pornography, was unconstitutional unless the govern-
ment could show that voluntary use of filters was an inadequate alternative
means of protecting children.64 In another closely watched case, the Court
effectively ruled that the Free Exercise Clause did not require vouchers for
religious schools, with only Justices Scalia and Thomas dissenting.65 Conserva-
tives had long argued that state funding of secular education without also
funding religious education constituted discrimination against religion, but the
Court rejected that contention.66 And in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,67 Justices
O’Connor and Kennedy joined the liberals to reject a conservative attack on the
Alien Tort Statute,68 which permits foreign nationals to sue for damages in
federal courts for violations of international human rights.69 Although the Court
read the Alien Tort Statute narrowly, it rejected the Bush Administration’s
position that it provided no cause of action whatsoever absent further legislation
by Congress.70
The Court’s conservative majority held together in other cases, but these
cases paled in significance compared to those in which the Court reached liberal
outcomes. Thus, the conservative majority ruled on technical jurisdictional
grounds that Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen arrested at O’Hare Airport and held in
military custody as an enemy combatant, had to re-file his petition for habeas
corpus because his lawyers had filed it in the wrong court.71 But five of the
Justices indicated that, had the petition been properly filed, they would have
ruled in Padilla’s favor on the merits.72 The traditional conservative majority
also ruled that the Court’s prior decision invalidating death sentences based on
facts not tried to a jury was not retroactive,73 and that citizens could be required
to identify themselves to police officers on the street without probable cause.74
However, these cases simply cannot compete for doctrinal significance or public
prominence with the more liberal-leaning results of the 2003 Term.
63. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000).
64. See Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 659–61, 673 (2004).
65. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715 (2004).
66. See id. at 725.
67. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
69. See Sosa, 542 U.S. 692.
70. See id. at 714.
71. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 451 (2004).
72. For four Justices in dissent, Justice Stevens stated that “I believe that the Non-Detention Act, 18
U.S.C. § 4001(a), prohibits—and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution, 115
Stat. 224, adopted on September 18, 2001, does not authorize—the protracted, incommunicado
detention of American citizens arrested in the United States.” Padilla, 542 U.S. at 464 n.8 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). And Justice Scalia, who joined the majority in Padilla on jurisdictional grounds, made clear
in his opinion in Hamdi that in his view, the government has no authority to hold U.S. citizens without
a criminal trial unless it gets Congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507, 573–74 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004).
74. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 188–89 (2004).
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Of twenty-two cases decided by a 5-4 vote in the Court’s 2004 Term, the
five-member conservative bloc voted together only four times.75 Once again,
conservative Justices joined liberal majorities in many of the Court’s most
prominent cases. In perhaps the most controversial decision of the Term, the
Court rebuffed another conservative property rights argument, upholding broad
use of eminent domain, as Justice Kennedy joined the liberal Justices to make a
5-4 majority.76 In another case, Justices Scalia and Thomas joined Justices
Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens to declare unconstitutional the federal sentencing
guidelines.77 In a decision rejecting a narrow construction of the reach of
Congress’s Commerce Clause power, Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined the
liberals to uphold federal legislation banning private use of marijuana.78 Justice
Kennedy joined his more liberal counterparts to hold unconstitutional the
application of the death penalty to juveniles who committed their crimes before
turning eighteen.79 And for only the third time ever, the Court found another
instance of ineffective assistance of counsel in a criminal case, as Justice
O’Connor sided with the liberal Justices.80
In a handful of cases involving constitutional and statutory discrimination
claims, the Court adopted pro-civil-rights rulings, as conservatives again split to
give the liberal Justices the majority. Justice O’Connor joined with the liberal
Justices to hold that Title IX,81 which prohibits sex discrimination in schools,
provides a cause of action for retaliation.82 The Court ruled that a California
prison scheme that segregated prisoners by race, ostensibly for security pur-
poses, was constitutionally suspect,83 that the Americans with Disabilities Act
applies in some circumstances to foreign cruise ships,84 and that age discrimina-
75. See Linda Greenhouse, Court’s Term a Turn Back to the Center, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2005, at A1.
Four of these cases were 5-3 votes in which Chief Justice Rehnquist did not participate for health
reasons. Id.
76. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). Some might argue that this outcome
was a conservative result, in that it allowed the state to take a poor woman’s property and transfer it to a
developer. But that would mistake the facts for the broader legal implications at stake. The case was
part of a concerted conservative campaign to resist societal regulation of private property and was
brought by the Institute for Justice, a conservative public interest legal organization. Moreover, to
characterize it as conservative would require an explanation for why four liberal Justices voted for the
result and four conservative Justices voted against it.
77. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 242 (2005).
78. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2201 (2005). Like Kelo, one might see the result as
conservative if one focused on the specific factual setting—application of a federal antidrug law to
users of marijuana for medicinal purposes. But the broader doctrinal significance of the case concerned
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, a “states’ rights” issue on which the conservatives had
made significant inroads in prior years. That is why Justices O’Connor (joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist) and Thomas dissented, maintaining that Congress had no power to reach the conduct in
question.
79. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
80. See Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456, 2463 (2005).
81. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
82. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 125 S. Ct. 1497, 1502 (2005).
83. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509 (2005).
84. See Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2169, 2715 (2005).
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tion suits can proceed on a showing of disparate impact.85 And the Court
reversed a murder conviction on grounds of racial discrimination in selection of
the jury.86
The Supreme Court prior to Bush v. Gore looks like a different court
altogether. In the years preceding Bush v. Gore, the Rehnquist Court had begun
to assert itself aggressively in a number of areas. Most significantly, it had
generated a states’ rights revolution of sorts, reining in Congress’s Commerce
Clause power, reading the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments expansively to
protect state prerogatives, and sharply restricting Congress’s authority under the
Fourteenth Amendment to enact anti-discrimination legislation, in all but one
case by 5-4 votes pitting the conservative bloc against the liberal bloc.87 Before
Bush v. Gore, the Court had also invalidated race-conscious redistricting de-
signed to maximize minority voting power, even comparing such efforts to
apartheid88—often by the same 5-4 vote.89 In 1997, the conservative majority
eased restrictions on government aid to religious schools, overturning a 1985
holding barring such aid,90 and in 2000 the same majority, this time joined by
Justice Breyer, upheld a federal program of aid to religious schools.91 Prior to
Bush v. Gore, the Court narrowly construed limits on police power in the
criminal context, upholding the power of police to use pretextual traffic stops to
85. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1540 (2005).
86. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2322, 2339–40 (2005).
87. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (striking down the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.)); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67
(2000) (holding that states cannot be sued for damages for violating the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2000)); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999)
(finding that states cannot be sued in state courts for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29
U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (1994)); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666, 691 (1999) (finding that states cannot be sued for damages for violating trademark law); Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999) (finding that
states cannot be sued for damages for infringing patents); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935
(1997) (invalidating the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady bill), Pub. L. No. 103-159, tit.
I, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.), requirement
that local law enforcement officials assist in background checks of gun purchasers); City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (finding with a 6-3 vote that Congress lacks the power under the
Fourteenth Amendment to require states to accommodate religious beliefs); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding that states cannot be sued for damages for violating laws
enacted under Congress’s Commerce Clause power); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995)
(invalidating, for the first time in decades, a statute as reaching beyond the Commerce Clause).
88. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (comparing racial reapportionment to “political
apartheid”).
89. See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 341 (2000) (holding that the Justice
Department can deny preclearance of redistricting plans only where there is evidence of backsliding in
minority voting power); Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 78–79 (1997) (upholding a redistricting
scheme in Georgia against a challenge that it diluted minority voting); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899,
901–02 (1996) (invalidating a race-conscious redistricting scheme in North Carolina); Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 927–28 (1995) (invalidating a race-conscious redistricting scheme in Georgia).
90. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 208–09 (1997) (overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402
(1985)).
91. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 801 (2000) (6-3 decision).
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search for drugs,92 to stop persons who flee even where there is no other
individualized reason to suspect them of criminal activity,93 to search without
probable cause guests who are in a private home for business purposes,94 and to
search the personal belongings of innocent passengers in cars so long as there is
probable cause to search the car as a whole.95 All but the first of these cases was
decided by the same conservative-liberal divide, with Justice Breyer twice
joining the conservatives. Indeed, in the Term immediately preceding Bush v.
Gore, the four liberal Justices managed to find themselves in a 5-4 majority in
only a single case.96
This is not to suggest that the Court reached exclusively conservative results
in the years before Bush v. Gore. For example, in the four Terms preceding the
2000 election, the Court struck down a federal statute that sought to overrule
Miranda v. Arizona97 and a Chicago antigang loitering ordinance;98 rejected a
rule requiring civil rights plaintiffs to plead their complaints with greater
specificity than other litigants;99 invalidated a federal forfeiture law as unconsti-
tutional;100 reaffirmed the validity of state limits on electoral campaign contribu-
tions;101 held unconstitutional a scheme for student-directed school prayer at
Texas high school football games;102 and struck down limits on sexually
explicit programming on cable television103 and the Internet.104 But five of
these eight decisions were decided by margins greater than 5-4, suggesting that
they were less close calls to begin with.
This qualitative review of the Rehnquist Court’s jurisprudence before and
after Bush v. Gore is necessarily selective. I have strived to report fairly on the
Court’s most prominent cases involving issues that typically trigger conservative-
liberal divisions, but selecting these cases necessarily involves a certain exercise
of judgment. I have focused on the Court’s closely divided cases because cases
decided by lopsided majorities are likely be less controversial, and therefore
less likely to be affected by the concerns of perceived partisanship and legiti-
macy. I have also focused on the Court’s prominent cases because it is there that
the Justices are most likely to sense that the public is watching. The brief
92. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818–19 (1996) (unanimous decision).
93. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125–26 (2000) (5-4 decision).
94. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (6-3 decision).
95. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307 (1999) (6-3 decision).
96. See Linda Greenhouse, The Nation: Split Decisions; The Court Rules, America Changes, N.Y.
TIMES, July 2, 2000, § 4, at 1. The case was Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), which invalidated
an anti-abortion law that failed to recognize an exception to preserve the health of the mother. In that
case, Justice O’Connor joined the liberals to give them a majority.
97. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 431–32 (2000) (7-2 decision).
98. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999) (6-3 decision).
99. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 594–95 (1998) (5-4 decision).
100. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 324 (1998) (5-4 decision).
101. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 381–82 (2000) (6-3 decision).
102. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000) (6-3 decision).
103. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 826–67 (2000) (5-4 decision).
104. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (7-2 decision).
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summary recounted above suggests that when one focuses on the prominent,
closely decided cases that typically trigger conservative-liberal splits, the Rehn-
quist Court was substantially less predictably conservative after Bush v. Gore
than before, as conservative Justices showed more of an inclination to side with
their liberal colleagues on the bench.
A statistical comparison of the four Terms after Bush v. Gore to the four
Terms that preceded it supports the qualitative account, providing solid empiri-
cal evidence that partisan lines softened and that conservatives more often
joined with liberals to form majorities in closely fought cases. Like the qualita-
tive account, my statistical analysis also sought to examine the Court’s promi-
nent and closely divided cases. To avoid my own bias, I used as a proxy for
“prominent” those cases involving individual rights or federalism discussed by
Linda Greenhouse in her annual New York Times articles reviewing the most
important cases of the Supreme Court’s Term.105 Greenhouse’s articles appear
shortly after each Term ends and provide an overview of the Court’s Term,
briefly describing the voting alignments and holdings in the Court’s more
notable decisions. As a proxy for “closely divided,” I focused on the 5-4
decisions among the prominent cases.106 In the four years before Bush v. Gore,
the traditional 5-4 split, with the five conservative Justices in the majority,
occurred sixteen times in “prominent” cases.107 In the four years after Bush v.
Gore, that configuration occurred twelve times,108 for a decrease of 25%. The
105. See Linda Greenhouse, Benchmarks of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1997, at A1; Linda
Greenhouse, Court Had Rehnquist Initials Intricately Carved on Docket, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2002, at
A1; Greenhouse, supra note 75, at A1; Linda Greenhouse, In Year of Florida Vote, Supreme Court Also
Did Much Other Work, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2001, at A12; Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Weaves
Legal Principles from a Tangle of Litigation, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1998, at A20; Greenhouse, supra
note 96; Linda Greenhouse, The Nation: Supreme Court; The Justices Decide Who’s in Charge, N.Y.
TIMES, June 27, 1999, § 4, at 1; Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: Overview; In a Momentous
Term, Justices Remake the Law, and the Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2003, at A1; Greenhouse, supra note
56.
106. Due to partial concurrences, outcomes are not always clear-cut 5-4 decisions; votes can be
counted in different ways. I relied on the Harvard Law Review’s yearly statistical reviews of the
previous Term, which track true 5-4’s—that is, where four Justices voted to decide a case in a manner
different than that of the majority. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—The Statistics, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 431, 434 n.i (1997). I then cross-referenced the 5-4 cases listed in the Harvard Statistics that
consist of the traditional conservative or liberal majority with the individual rights and federalism cases
appearing in Ms. Greenhouse’s year-end articles to compile a list of “important” 5-4 cases from each
Term that were decided along traditional lines.
107. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000);
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); College Sav.
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Jones v. United States,
527 U.S. 373 (1999); Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998); Gebser
v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997);
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); O’Dell v.
Netherland, 521 U.S. 151 (1997); Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997).
108. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004);
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004); Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist., 542 U.S. 177 (2004); Vieth v.
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traditional liberal 5-4 split (the liberals joined by either Justice O’Connor or
Justice Kennedy) occurred only five times in “prominent” cases in the four
years before Bush v. Gore,109 but fourteen times in the four years afterward,110
nearly a three-fold increase.
Consistent with my theory that this trend would be most evident in the cases
most closely watched, the liberalizing trend is somewhat less evident, although
still present, when one considers all 5-4 splits, not just those involving indi-
vidual rights or federalism and sufficiently notable to make Linda Greenhouse’s
year-end overview. There have been seventy-two 5-4 splits in the four Terms
since Bush v. Gore, as compared with sixty-seven such splits in the four Terms
before Bush v. Gore. In 5-4 cases, the conservative majority has voted together
less often in the wake of Bush v. Gore (38.9% after vs. 47.8% before), while the
liberal majority has voted together slightly more often (27.8% after vs. 20.9%
before). The fact that these shifts are less pronounced than in the prominent
cases is consistent with my hypothesis that the Justices would put a premium on
countering the perception of partisanship in the cases that receive the most
attention.111
There has also been an increase in “unusual” 5-4 splits since Bush v. Gore in
prominent cases, using “unusual” to denote splits that fall into neither the
traditional liberal nor the traditional conservative groupings, and prominent to
mean cases involving individual rights and federalism identified in Ms. Green-
house’s year-end review. In the four Terms before Bush v. Gore, there were
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003); Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S.
461 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003);
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639
(2002); McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002).
109. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S.
629 (1999); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998);
Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997).
110. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005); Kelo v. City of New London,
125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005); Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456 (2005); Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line
Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2169 (2005); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004); Tennessee v. Lane, 5414 U.S.
509 (2004); Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004); McConnell v. FEC, 540
U.S. 93 (2003); Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003);
Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002); Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
111. There were eighteen 5-4 votes in the 1996 Term, fifteen in 1997, sixteen in the 1998 Term, and
eighteen in the 1999 Term. See The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—The Statistics, supra note 106, at 434;
The Supreme Court, 1997 Term—The Statistics, 112 HARV. L. REV. 366, 371 (1998); The Supreme
Court, 1998 Term—The Statistics, 113 HARV. L. REV. 400, 405 (1999); The Supreme Court, 1999
Term—The Statistics, 114 HARV. L. REV. 390, 395 (2000). The traditional conservative majority
accounted for thirty-two of the sixty-seven 5-4 cases, and the traditional liberal majority accounted for
fourteen. See id. Following the Term of Bush v. Gore, there were twenty-one 5-4 votes in October Term
2001, fourteen in 2002, nineteen in 2003, and eighteen in 2004. See The Supreme Court, 2001
Term—The Statistics, supra note 45, at 458; The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—The Statistics, supra note
45, at 485; The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—The Statistics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 497, 503 (2004); The
Supreme Court, 2004 Term—The Statistics, supra note 45, at 424. During these four Terms, the
traditional conservative majority accounted for twenty-eight of seventy-two 5-4 cases, and the tradi-
tional liberal majority accounted for twenty.
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seven such unusual splits;112 in the four years afterward, there were eleven,113
an increase of over 56%.
Finally, there is evidence that Justice O’Connor in particular and, to a lesser
extent, Justice Kennedy were more likely to join liberal majorities in prominent
contested cases since Bush v. Gore. If one considers only those cases in which
the four more liberal Justices vote together and are joined in a 5-4 or 6-3
majority by Justice O’Connor, Justice Kennedy, or both, one finds that Justice
O’Connor sided with the liberals almost twice as often in the four years after
Bush v. Gore as before. She voted with the liberal bloc eight times in the four
years before Bush v. Gore and fifteen times in the four years after Bush v.
Gore.114 Over the same period, Justice Kennedy sided with the liberal bloc
slightly more often post-Bush v. Gore, doing so seven times prior to the decision
and nine times afterward.115
One should not make too much of this data. The Court decides only a
relatively small number of sharply divisive and prominent cases each Term, so
the annual sample size is small. Furthermore, because there have been only four
Terms since Bush v. Gore, the overall numbers available to work with are not as
large as a statistician might like. At the same time, the admittedly primitive
quantitative analysis reinforces the qualitative account. It seems fair to say that
112. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529
U.S. 803 (2000); United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998); Glickman v. Wileman Bros. &
Elliott, 521 U.S. 457 (1997); Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997);
Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S.
357 (1997).
113. See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005); Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005);
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (consisting of two “unusual” 5-4 majorities, each
delivering the opinion of the Court in part); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004); Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003); Virginia v.
Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003); Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002);
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002); US Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002); Thompson
v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
114. Compare Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S.
290 (2000), Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581
(1999), City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999), Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526
U.S. 629 (1999), Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), and M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996),
with McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005), Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456
(2005), Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317 (2005), Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), Tennard v.
Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004), Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004), Alaska Dep’t of Envtl.
Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004), McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003),
Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003), Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002), Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002), and EEOC v. Waffle House,
Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
115. Compare Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. 290, Williams, 529 U.S. 362, Olmstead, 527 U.S.
581, City of Chicago, 527 U.S. 41, Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998), Crawford-El v. Britton,
523 U.S. 574 (1998), and M.L.B., 519 U.S. 102, with Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655
(2005), Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. 2317, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), Missouri v. Seibert, 542
U.S. 600 (2004), Rasul, 542 U.S. 466, Tennard, 542 U.S. 274, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, Atkins, 536
U.S. 304, and EEOC, 534 U.S. 279.
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the Rehnquist Court shifted to the left after Bush v. Gore, at least in its most
prominent and controversial cases—namely, those involving federalism and
individual rights—toward less predictably partisan divisions and more liberal
results. In my view, the most likely explanation for this development is not that
the conservative Justices suddenly had a change in their underlying political
beliefs, but that their sensitivity to restoring the legitimacy of the institution led
them to be more open to forming alliances across traditional battle lines.
III. THE AFTERMATH: RESTORING THE RULE OF LAW
If the Court were concerned about the tarnishing of its image in the aftermath
of Bush v. Gore, one might also expect to see a renewed emphasis on what
differentiates law from politics. The cases from the 2003 Term that inspired this
Symposium fit this pattern, too. Each in its own way stresses the values of the
rule of law and, in particular, the importance of legal constraints on official
discretion and fair procedures for assessing the propriety of deprivations of
liberty. If increased concern for the rule of law is an outcome of Bush v. Gore, it
could not have come at a more propitious time, as the threat of terrorism in the
wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, has led the Executive Branch to
launch an aggressive assault on those very values. Perhaps the Court’s single
most important post-Bush v. Gore decision, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, directly rebuffs
the assault on the rule of law, proclaiming in the now famous words of Justice
O’Connor that “a state of war is not a blank check for the President . . . .”116
The results in the enemy combatant cases strongly reaffirm rule of law values
in a context in which the Supreme Court has historically allowed deference to
the political branches to trump virtually all legal considerations. In World War I,
Congress authorized and the Executive undertook a nationwide campaign of
prosecuting and incarcerating critics of the war, and the Court affirmed every
conviction that reached it.117 In World War II, the Court infamously deferred to
the Executive on the asserted (but entirely unproven) necessity of detaining
120,000 persons of Japanese ancestry on the suspicion that some among them
might be spies or saboteurs.118 In the Cold War, the Court did nothing to check
the abuses of McCarthyism until three years after the Senate had censured
Senator McCarthy and the movement was on the wane.119 While the Court
116. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004).
117. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919) (upholding the conviction of
defendants who distributed circulars in support of the Russian Revolution); Debs v. United States, 249
U.S. 211, 216 (1919) (upholding the conviction of a defendant who made public speech in support of
socialism); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 210 (1919) (upholding the conviction of
defendants who published newspaper articles critical of the war effort); Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (upholding the conviction of defendants who circulated anti-war leaflets to drafted
and enlisted individuals).
118. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944).
119. See, e.g., MICHAL R. BELKNAP, COLD WAR POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE SMITH ACT, THE COMMUNIST
PARTY, AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 215, 236 (1977); ARTHUR J. SABIN, IN CALMER TIMES: THE SUPREME
COURT AND RED MONDAY 213 (1999).
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eventually—after the immediate crises passed—adopted doctrines that make a
direct repetition of these abuses substantially less likely today,120 its perfor-
mance in the midst of each crisis was lamentable and hardly inspired faith in the
rule of law.
The 2004 enemy combatant decisions, by contrast, strongly rejected claims
that the Court must defer to the Executive in the midst of the crisis.121 The
administration argued that the courts had no jurisdiction, and therefore literally
no role to play, with respect to the detention of hundreds of foreign nationals at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.122 It went so far as to maintain that any legislative or
judicial limitation on the President’s power to detain enemy combatants would
be an unconstitutional infringement of the Article II Commander-in-Chief
authority.123 The administration initially took virtually the same position with
regard to citizens held as “enemy combatants” in the United States, but after the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected that “sweeping proposition” in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,124 the government fell back to a position that admitted that
the courts had jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by United States citizens
held in the United States.125 Nevertheless, the government asserted that the
courts’ role was limited to making sure the Executive Branch had said the right
words in an affidavit classifying the detainee as an enemy combatant.126 On its
view, the courts could not look behind the affidavit, could not assess the truth of
the facts asserted therein, and were obligated to accept generic unidentified
hearsay assertions as sufficient to justify the detentions.
The Supreme Court rejected both positions. In Rasul v. Bush, the Court held
that federal courts do in fact have jurisdiction to entertain challenges to the
detention of foreign nationals at Guatanamo Bay.127 Guantanamo Bay would
not be, as the Administration had hoped, a lawless zone where the government
could hold human beings indefinitely without process, without any accounting
as to why the detainees were there, and without any legal limits. The rule of law
would apply, enforceable in federal courts. The Court did not directly resolve
the merits of what rights the detainees had or whether those rights had been
violated, as those matters had not been decided below, but it did state that if
proven true, the detainees’ allegations unquestionably stated a claim for re-
lief.128 And it reversed the decisions of the lower courts, which had thrown out
the challenges at the jurisdictional threshold, largely on the reasoning that
120. See David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times
of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565, 2573–75 (2003).
121. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 507; Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S.
426 (2004).
122. See Brief for Respondents at 13–15, Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (Nos. 03-334, 03-343).
123. Id. at 42, 44.
124. 296 F.3d 283 (4th Cir. 2002).
125. See, e.g., Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480.
126. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 25–27, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696).
127. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480.
128. See id. at 484 & n.15.
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foreign nationals outside the border have no constitutional rights.129
In Hamdi, the Court even more dramatically affirmed the importance of the
rule of law. Here the Court reached the merits, and although it upheld the
Executive’s authority to detain as an enemy combatant a U.S. citizen captured
fighting for the Taliban on a battlefield in Afghanistan, it rejected, by a vote of
8-1, the Administration’s position that the courts’ role was limited to rubber-
stamping a hearsay declaration asserting that the detainee was in fact aligned
with enemy forces.130 Instead, the Court insisted that the fundamental requisites
of due process applied, namely notice of the charges and a meaningful opportu-
nity to present a defense before a neutral decisionmaker.131 As noted above,
Justice O’Connor, writing for the plurality, strongly affirmed the continuing
relevance of the limits of constitutional law on the President, even when he was
acting as Commander-in-Chief pursuant to a congressional authorization to use
military force, and even where the capture had taken place on a foreign
battlefield.132
Other Justices also strongly affirmed the importance of legal limits. Justice
Souter explained that, given the hydraulics of national security, trust in the
Executive is particularly ill-placed on questions of liberty and security:
In a government of separated powers, deciding finally on what is a reasonable
degree of guaranteed liberty whether in peace or war (or some condition in
between) is not well entrusted to the Executive Branch of Government, whose
particular responsibility is to maintain security. For reasons of inescapable
human nature, the branch of the Government asked to counter a serious threat
is not the branch on which to rest the Nation’s entire reliance in striking the
balance between the will to win and the cost in liberty on the way to victory;
the responsibility for security will naturally amplify the claim that security
legitimately raises.133
And Justice Stevens, dissenting in Padilla, insisted that the rule of law was even
more important to a democratic state than the right to vote itself: “Even more
important than the method of selecting the people’s rulers and their successors
is the character of the constraints imposed on the Executive by the rule of
law.”134
The Blakely and Crawford decisions also sounded important rule of law
129. See id. at 484; cf. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that
habeas relief may not be made available to aliens when basic constitutional rights are not); Rasul v.
Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 70–71 (D.D.C. 2002) (same).
130. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533–35, 537. Only Justice Thomas adopted the Executive’s position
that the courts’ role was limited to rubber-stamping a declaration filed by the government. See id. at
579, 581–86 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 509, 533 (majority opinion).
132. See id. at 518, 536.
133. Id. at 545 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment).
134. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 52 U.S. 426, 465 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting). As noted above, the
majority declined to reach the merits in Padilla’s case, concluding that Padilla’s lawyers had filed their
1446 [Vol. 94:1427THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
themes, but with a different twist. Where the enemy combatant cases stressed
the importance of judicially enforceable legal limits on Executive power, even
in wartime, in Blakely and Crawford the Court emphasized the need for legal
limits on the power of judges in particular. Both cases are ultimately about the
role of juries in checking the power of judges. The infirmity in the sentencing
guidelines invalidated in Blakely was precisely that they gave judges too much
discretion; the Court’s solution was to read the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial
provision to require that a jury try any contested facts used to increase a
sentence beyond the prescribed statutory maximum set out by the legislature.135
As the Court explained, the jury trial right is “no mere procedural formality, but
a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure. Just as
suffrage ensures the people’s ultimate control in the legislative and executive
branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary.”136
Similarly, in Crawford the Court insisted that its view of the Confrontation
Clause was important precisely to restrict judicial discretion and to elevate law
over discretionary judgment. For the Court, Justice Scalia wrote:
We have no doubt that the courts below were acting in utmost good faith
when they found reliability. The Framers, however, would not have been
content to indulge this assumption. They knew that judges, like other govern-
ment officers, could not always be trusted to safeguard the rights of the
people; the likes of the dread Lord Jeffreys were not yet too distant a memory.
They were loath to leave too much discretion in judicial hands. By replacing
categorical constitutional guarantees with open-ended balancing tests, we do
violence to their design.137
It is particularly interesting, in light of the criticisms of Bush v. Gore, that in
both Blakely and Crawford the Court emphasized the need for legal constraints
on judicial decision making.
In short, in each of these decisions the Court crossed traditional conservative-
liberal lines, reached the more liberal result, and expressly affirmed the value of
the rule of law in doing so. And as I suggest above, these cases are not
aberrations, but part of a larger trend evident in the Rehnquist Court after Bush
v. Gore—toward rehabilitating the Court’s legitimacy as the institution that
“say[s] what the law is.”138
If this assessment is correct, then Bush v. Gore may have a silver lining.
Although the Court intervened in a contentious political dispute to cement the
victory of a President who lost the popular election but would have won an
habeas petition in the wrong court because when they filed it in New York, he had already been
transferred to a naval brig in South Carolina. See id. at 432, 447.
135. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301, 304–06.
136. Id. at 305–06.
137. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67–68 (2004) (citations omitted).
138. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (noting that it is “emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department” to interpret rules of law).
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election among the sitting Justices, the very controversy the Court stirred by
taking such action seems to have prompted its conservative members, those
who would be held “responsible” for Bush v. Gore, to be more open to crossing
traditional lines to support more liberal results. As such, it may have triggered
an increased emphasis on the “rule of law” as a way of restoring the perception
that the Court is guided by law, not partisan politics, in its constitutional
decisionmaking. And with the Executive Branch asserting unchecked power and
relying increasingly on secrecy in the “war on terror,” a heightened sensitivity
to the rule of law has never been more important. It is noteworthy that despite
the widespread public criticism of the Administration’s assertion of unchecked
authority over U.S. citizen “enemy combatants,” only the Court was willing to
stand up to the President.
IV. CONCLUSION
One of the things that made Bush v. Gore such a difficult case was the evident
fact that among the issues at stake was the future composition of the Supreme
Court itself. Whoever won the 2000 election might well have determined which
of the Justices would be casting majority votes and shaping the law for the rest
of their careers and which ones would be relegated to dissent. The conservative
majority voted as a bloc, as they had consistently done in the period preceding
the decision, and prevailed. Ironically, though, the Rehnquist Court seems to
have moved to the left after Bush v. Gore, as conservative Justices showed more
inclination to side with their liberal counterparts in support of liberal outcomes.
And in at least some of their most prominent decisions, the Rehnquist Court
displayed a particular sensitivity to the rule of law. These reactions may well
reflect efforts—possibly conscious, but more likely subconscious—to rehabili-
tate the Court’s image with the public, to dispel the charge that it is just another
political, partisan institution, and to restore the legitimacy it enjoys as a body
ruled by law rather than everyday politics.
It is far too soon to conclude, however, that Bush won the battle but lost the
war with respect to conservative hegemony on the Supreme Court and Bush v.
Gore. For one thing, while the data discussed above do suggest that the
Rehnquist Court reacted to the criticism directed at its intervention, the Rehn-
quist Court is no more. Because George Bush was in office on September 11,
2001, in part thanks to Bush v. Gore, he gained a huge boost in popular support
attributable to the rally-around-the-leader effect of such an attack. President
Bush’s approval ratings shortly after the attacks stood at 90 percent, the highest
ever recorded for a President.139 That boost in turn may well have contributed to
President Bush’s victory over Sen. John Kerry in 2004, which has now paid off
in the opportunity to appoint two Justices to the Supreme Court.
139. See A Nation Challenged, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2001, at B6 (reporting on a Gallup Poll,
conducted on Sept. 21–22, 2001, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/polls/tables/live/2003-11-
17-bush-poll.htm).
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So what should we make of Bush v. Gore now that the Rehnquist Court is
history? What will its impact be on the Roberts Court? Will Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito feel as obliged to side with their liberal colleagues as
with their conservative ones, especially given their appointment by a President
who has declared Justices Scalia and Thomas as his ideal Justices? Predicting
the direction of the Supreme Court is always a hazardous game. But it is worth
noting that, as Justice Robert Jackson has written, “the Court influences appoin-
tees more consistently than appointees influence the Court.”140 Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito, while less likely to feel “responsible” for Bush v.
Gore, are nonetheless well aware of the criticism it brought on the Court for its
apparent partisanship. They, too, as new Justices, have an interest in the
long-term legitimacy of the Court as an institution and therefore in the public
perception of its workings. Thus, even though they were not personally in-
volved in the decision, they too may feel a subconscious pull to dispel the
appearance of partisan division.
More broadly, the phenomenon identified in this paper suggests that public
opinion can play a substantial checking function with respect to judicial decision-
making. This checking function in turn plays an important role in constraining
the Court and therefore in maintaining its legitimacy. The Court decides, the
public reacts, and the Court then responds accordingly. In some historic in-
stances, the reaction and response have been focused on specific doctrines, as
illustrated by the Court’s repudiation of Lochner v. New York141 in the wake of
widespread criticism, the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the Depression
and the New Deal, and President Roosevelt’s threat of a court-packing plan.
Justice Scalia has argued that judicial response to popular pressure regarding
particular doctrines undermines the Court’s legitimacy, because the Court is
supposed to be above the political fray and to act as a check on majoritarian
will.142 But in the case of Bush v. Gore, the reaction and response were focused
not on any specific substantive doctrinal developments, but rather on the role of
the Court itself in a democratic polity. The criticisms of Bush v. Gore were not
that the Court got the equal protection doctrine wrong, although it almost
certainly did, but that it acted very much like a political institution, not a court
of law. Instead of staying above the fray and being guided by long-term legal
principle, it was right there in the muck, driven, by all appearances, by partisan
self-interest. Here the criticism is directed not at outcome but at rule.
Institutional meta-criticism of this type—that the Court is not acting like a
court should—is of a very different order than criticism of specific substantive
doctrines, and responding to it is likely to reinforce rather than undermine the
140. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY OF A CRISIS IN AMERICAN
POWER POLITICS vii (Octagon Books 1979) (1941).
141. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
142. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 996 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court undercuts its own legitimacy by responding to public pressure in ruling on
abortion issues).
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Court’s overall legitimacy. Admittedly, it is not always easy to tell the differ-
ence. Substantive commitments on particular issues often drive institutional
critiques, as illustrated by the use of the term “judicial activism” by all sides to
label decisions of whose substantive bottom lines they disapprove. But in the
case of Bush v. Gore, the focal point of the criticism was precisely the Court’s
institutional role. In the context of Bush v. Gore, the debate was not about the
right doctrinal result, but about the proper role of courts in a democratic society.
On that meta-subject, the Court must, and properly does, take public opinion
into account. In the end, it is public opinion about whether the Court is playing
its proper role that determines the Court’s legitimacy, and gives it the authority
to resolve contested constitutional disputes. Because Bush v. Gore called that
authority into question, the decision has had a liberal legacy that few would
have ever predicted.
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ADDENDUM A – A Survey of Unsigned Editorials in the Top 20
Newspapers by Circulation in the Week Following Bush v. Gore
Editorials (unsigned) Positive Neutral Critical
7 to 2, WALL. ST. J., Dec. 13, 2000, at A26 (marking
the decision as requiring Gore’s concession). X
A Damaged Court, STAR-LEDGER (Newark), Dec. 14,
2000, at 38 (criticizing the opinion as “dubious”
and an abandonment of adherence to states’ rights). X
A President-Elect, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2000, at A34
(“We think the Supreme Court should have left to
Florida the question . . . of correcting the very real
flaws . . . in the voting system [and] thereby have
shown more deference to the legitimate impulse to
count as accurately as possible, while lessening
their own political jeopardy”). X
A Promise to Keep, STAR-LEDGER (Newark), Dec. 15,
2000, at 34 (arguing that discontent with the
election should be directed at the Court, not at
Bush). X
A Victory for Equal Protection, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 13,
2000, at 22N (“Tuesday night’s decision suggests
that, while they will be criticized for their ruling,
the U.S. Supreme Court justices simply wouldn’t
tolerate a violation of the notion of equal
protection . . . .”). X
An End, at Last?, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 13, 2000, at
16A (labeling the decision “a murky mix of the
theoretical and practical”). X
Ballot Lock Box, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 16, 2000, at
A18 (criticizing the decision as inconsistent with
democracy and noting that “the biggest loser in
Bush v. Gore was neither candidate, but the
nation’s confidence in the impartiality of judges”). X
Beyond the Election; Supreme Court Fault Lines,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, at A38 (“[R]ather than
ennobling the law and the Constitution, and
sagaciously bringing the election to a resolution
built on the ballot, the justices eroded public
confidence in the court itself.”). X
Beyond the Election; Mr. Gore’s Farewell, Mr.
Bush’s Task, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, at A38
(insisting that Bush will have to rectify the failure
of the Court to legitimize his presidency). X
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Editorials (unsigned) Positive Neutral Critical
Bush v. Gore, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2000, at A46
(remarking, in advance of the decision and with
regard to the oral arguments only, that “the court’s
hearing . . . didn’t strike us as a partisan
squabble”). X
Can Supreme Court Lead Nation Out of This Mess?,
S.F. CHRON., Dec. 12, 2000, at A28 (warning, in
advance of the decision, that “any 5-to-4 ruling will
be fair game for charges of partisanship”). X
Candidates’ New Mantra: Unite a ‘House Divided’,
S.F. CHRON., Dec. 14, 2000, at A34 (criticizing the
decision as leaving “a bad odor in the nation’s air”
and being “tortured . . . border[ing] on
addlepated”). X
Catch-22 Ruling Brings Election Near Messy End,
USA TODAY, Dec. 13, 2000, at 16A (“If the U.S.
Supreme Court sought to bring the presidential
election to a dignified and convincing ending in its
ruling Tuesday night, it failed utterly. Its splintered
decision injured its own credibility, that of the
courts generally and of the presidential election
process.”). X
Count Some of the Votes, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2000,
at A26 (cataloguing, in advance of the decision and
with regard to the oral arguments only, the
weaknesses in the Gore arguments presented to the
Court). X
Court’s Tangled Ruling Produces Clear-Cut Results,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 13, 2000, at 22A
(“[T]his is perhaps the least acceptable outcome the
court could have produced, because its decision
was based not on the issue of justice, or on the U.S.
Constitution, or even on Florida law, but on the
basis of the calendar.”). X
Don’t Blame the Supreme Court, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 15,
2000, at 28N (arguing that the Supreme Court did
what was necessary to preserve basic rules of
fairness.). X
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Editorials (unsigned) Positive Neutral Critical
Equal Protection: Supreme Court Rules Recounts
Must Have Standards, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 13,
2000, at A42 (labeling the decision as lacking both
clarity and finality and stating that it “raised
suspicions that [the Court’s] members are political
creatures who are willing to influence and define
the nation’s political process.”). X
Healing Can Begin in Wake of Court Ruling,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 13, 2000, at 22A
(expressing extreme pleasure that the Supreme
Court “recognized the illegitimacy of the
recounting carnival in Florida.”). X
High Court Overrules Voters, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.),
Dec. 13, 2000, at 38 (criticizing the Supreme Court
for substituting its judgment for the will of the
voters and giving the White House to the wrong
man). X
High Court’s Integrity at Risk, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.),
Dec. 12, 2000, at 50 (warning that the Supreme
Court must be exceedingly careful not to give any
appearance of picking a winner by replacing the
will of the people with its own judgment.). X
Image of Justices as Partisans Is Overdone, USA
TODAY, Dec. 12, 2000, at 16A (determining that the
justices refrained from marching “straight down
the expected ideological path” and thereby lent
some much needed credibility to the electoral
process). X
In Court: Equal Protection Could Muddle Elections
Nationwide, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 17, 2000, at 2
(predicting that the Court’s decision applying equal
protection to individual voters will spawn litigation
of election disputes nationwide with uncertain
results and effects that drag out past the time the
winner is to take office). X
Low Moment for High Court, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.),
Dec. 14, 2000, at 16 (criticizing the Court’s
decision as an unwise political decision that must
nonetheless be accepted and supported). X
Now’s the Time to Become United: Let the Governing
Begin, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Phoenix), Dec. 14, 2000, at
10B (urging unity after the “somewhat unsettling
conclusion” of the election). X
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Editorials (unsigned) Positive Neutral Critical
Power Not Authority, STAR-LEDGER (Newark), Dec.
14, 2000, at 39 (calling the result “a terrible
venture away from the territory of democracy”). X
Presidential Saga Winds Down; Time to Heal
Nation’s Election Wounds, ARIZ. REPUBLIC
(Phoenix), Dec. 13, 2000, at 8B (terming the
Supreme Court’s decision a “principled result”). X
‘Supreme’ Court?, DENVER POST, Dec. 13, 2000, at
B10 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s “fractured
per curiam decision will exacerbate, rather than
ease, our national division”). X
Supreme Irony, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2000, at A26
(calling the Court’s decision Rehnquist’s “finest
hour” after Gore’s inappropriate refusal to concede
forced the Court to decide the case and noting the
irony that Gore was “finally defeated by the very
legal process he sought to exploit.”). X
The Ballot Reform Imperative, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,
2000, § 4, at 16 (calling the Court’s decision the
“shameful post-mortem of the messy 2000
presidential contest.”). X
The Brilliant Boies Blunders, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 18,
2000, at A22 (attributing the outcome, in part, to
Vice President Gore’s attorney David Boies’
failure to offer the Court a defined uniform
standard). X
The Court Rules for Mr. Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13,
2000, at A34 (charging Americans to respect the
authority of the ruling and the legitimacy of the
new presidency whether or not they agree with the
ruling to bar a recount in Florida, which “comes at
considerable cost to the public trust and the
tradition of fair elections.”). X
The Court’s Gift to Dubya, STAR-LEDGER (Newark),
Dec. 14, 2000, at 39 (referring to the Court’s
“conservative cadre” as “the real engine that
crushed Al Gore”). X
The End of the Struggle, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2000, at
B8 (predicting that the “bitter set of decisions this
case has generated will taint this [C]ourt with
disquieting questions about its distance from the
partisan fray.”). X
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Editorials (unsigned) Positive Neutral Critical
The Nation’s Next Task, STAR-LEDGER (Newark), Dec.
13, 2000, at 24 (indicating that the Court’s decision
made a Gore victory impossible). X
The Ultimate Split Decision, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 13,
2000, at A22 (calling the Supreme Court a Bush
“trump card” falling cleanly on ideological lines,
and noting the unsettling impression that “politics
prevailed.”). X
Winner, Loser - Co-Conciliators, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Dec. 14, 2000, at 14B (stating that the
fact that “the victory involved the fractious
participation of the highest courts is regrettable,”
but emphasizing the importance of accepting the
final outcome and moving on as a nation). X
Total: 38 6 positive 12 neutral 18 critical
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ADDENDUM B – A Survey of Signed Op-Eds in the Top 20 Newspapers by
Circulation in the Week Following Bush v. Gore
Op-Editorials Positive Neutral Critical
Akhil Reed Amar, Should We Trust Judges?,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2000, at M1
(suggesting that the Bush v. Gore decision
was inconsistent with logic, history,
tradition, precedent, and the purposes
behind the Equal Protection Clause). X
Jack M. Balkin, Supreme Court
Compromises Its Legitimacy, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 12, 2000, at A23 (indicating
that an attempt to resolve a constitutional
crisis will destroy public faith in the
Court’s impartiality). X*
Margaret A. Burnham, A Cynical Supreme
Court, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 14, 2000, at
A23 (discussing how Bush v. Gore created
a new equal protection theory that the
Court used to obscure the election’s
inequalities and eviscerate black voters’
rights) X
Dennis Byrne, Public Behind Bush as
President, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 18, 2000, at
13N (suggesting that the decision
supported states’ rights by reinforcing
states’ abilities to set election rules and
that the Court only stopped the recount
because its selectivity violated the
Constitution). X
George Cantor, Democrats End Up Putting
Liberalism on Trial, DETROIT NEWS, Dec
16, 2000, at 8C (describing how the Court
justifiably stopped the recount, which
would have only included selected
counties without any standard definition
of a legal vote). X
Erwin Chemerinsky, Court Responds to
Values Rather than Partisanship, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 15, 2000, at B9 (arguing that
the Court’s decision should not be
criticized because it was political, but
rather because it failed to adequately
address the legal issues). X
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Op-Editorials Positive Neutral Critical
Lloyd N. Cutler, How Not to Repeat Florida,
WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2000, at A27
(suggesting that the Court should not have
decided a national political contest with a
single judicial vote). X
E. J. Dionne Jr., So Much for States’ Rights,
WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2000, at A35
(stating that the most troublesome aspect
of the opinion was the intrusion into a
state election process by champions of
states’ rights). X
Michael C. Dorf, Supreme Court Pulled a
Bait and Switch, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14,
2000, at B11 (criticizing the Court for
basing its opinion on the Fourteenth
Amendment when it had deemed the
Fourteenth Amendment issue not worthy
of review two weeks earlier). X
John Farmer, Gore Exit Steals Show,
STAR-LEDGER (Newark), Dec. 15, 2000, at
35 (citing the lack of time as one of the
reasons the majority used to bar the
recount). X
Thomas L. Friedman, Medal of Honor, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 15, 2000, at A39 (indicating
that the majority was more concerned
with meaningless deadlines than the
sanctity of votes in forming its opinion). X
Paul A. Gigot, Liberals Discover the
Tyranny of the Courts, WALL ST. J., Dec.
15, 2000, at A16 (describing the opinion
as “sav[ing] the country another month of
fighting before reaching the same result”). X
Ellen Goodman, Very Human Beings Under
Those Robes, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 14,
2000, at A23 (indicating that the Justices’
opinions were dictated by their politics). X
Lani Guinier, A New Voting Rights
Movement, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2000, at
A27 (stating that the Court’s decision
allowed the interests of the Florida
legislature to trump the rights of voters). X
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Op-Editorials Positive Neutral Critical
Jim Hoagland, Dynasty at Work, WASH.
POST, Dec. 14, 2000, at A35 (calling the
opinion “a shameful substitute for the
clear, compelling argument to the nation
they had obliged themselves to give”). X
Dennis J. Hutchinson, Law and Politics in
the U.S. Supreme Court, CHI. TRIB., Dec.
17, 2000, at 21C (arguing that the decision
was neither a “self-inflicted wound” nor a
triumph of law over politics). X
Neal Kumar Katyal, Politics Over Principle,
WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2000, at A35
(calling the opinion “lawless and
unprecedented”). X
Michael Kelly, Democracy Rescued, WASH.
POST, Dec. 14, 2000, at A35 (stating that
the Court was divided because of
disagreement about the remedy, not the
presence of constitutional problems with
the recount). X
Michael Kinsley, Unequal Protection,
WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2000, at A41
(arguing that the Court created a “newly
discovered constitutional right” of voters
to have an equal chance of having their
ballot counted correctly). X
Douglas W. Kmiec, The Court’s Decision Is
Law, Not Politics, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14,
2000, at B11 (describing the opinion has
“soundly reasoned” and having a
“measured tone”). X
Larry D. Kramer, No Surprise. It’s an
Activist Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2000,
at A33 (arguing, contrary to popular
wisdom, that the Rehnquist court is
activist and arrogant). X
Charles Krauthammer, Defenders of the
Law, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2000, at A41
(supporting the reasoning in Bush v. Gore
on the grounds that a liberal activist
Florida Supreme Court’s ruling was
arbitrary and unconstitutional). X
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Op-Editorials Positive Neutral Critical
Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; A Failure
of Reason, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2000, at
A19 (arguing that the curse of Bush v.
Gore is its failure to use legal reasoning to
reach the outcome). X
Michael W. McConnell, A Muddled Ruling,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2000, at A26
(noting the description of a “sharply split”
court misrepresents the Court’s decision
because Breyer and Souter indicated a
manual recount would be unconstitutional,
but ultimately declaring the decision was
unwise for the nation). X
Paul Mulshine, Gore is Dick Without the
Tricks, STAR-LEDGER (Newark), Dec. 12,
2000, at 31 (pointing out that the decision
was split along party lines). X
David Nyhan, Gore’s Best Moment Comes
Too Late, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 15, 2000,
at A27 (calling the decision “a 5-4 heist
that went against the wishes of 50 million
voters”). X
Charles J. Ogletree Jr., The Court’s
Tarnished Reputation, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 17, 2000, at C7 (arguing that the
biggest loser in Bush v. Gore is the
Supreme Court’s reputation). X
Clarence Page, Turning ‘Equal Protection’
Upside Down, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 17, 2000,
at 21C (noting that the Justices “sound[ed]
less judicial than political, and the
Supreme Court’s mighty reputation is
cheapened for years to come”). X
O. Ricardo Pimentel, Irreparable Harm Is
Right, Without Full Vote Count, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC (Phoenix), Dec. 12, 2000, at 7B
(criticizing the opinion’s logic as “purely
another case of [a] desired outcome in
search of a way to get there”). X
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Op-Editorials Positive Neutral Critical
William Raspberry, . . . Or Supremely
Biased?, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2000, at
A41 (complaining that “the U.S. Supreme
Court majority . . . seems to [have]
traversed at least half the distance
between philosophy and partisanship”). X
Robert Robb, Supremes’ Election Song Went
Flat, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Phoenix), Dec. 15,
2000, at 9B (critiquing the Court’s action
as “an improper judicial intervention in a
quintessentially political question” that
should have been decided by Congress). X
A.M. Rosenthal, Dissent That Stains the
Dissenters, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Dec. 15,
2000, at 81 (criticizing the dissent as a
“sweeping, overblown denunciation of the
court’s majority decision” that “seemed
intended to shake public confidence not
only in that opinion . . . but in the judicial
system itself”). X
Steven R. Rothman, Nation Can Reunite
Under Centrist Banner, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark), Dec. 15, 2000, at 34 (noting
that the decision eliminated any
appropriate options for Gore to continue
his challenge). X
William Safire, The Coming Together, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, at A39
(commending the Court for ending the
drawn-out dispute quickly and thus
avoiding the outcome that “many
now-reasonable opponents would have
become implacable enemies, and the
electorate would have been not just evenly
divided but angrily polarized”). X
Stephanie Salter, Court’s Politics: Not a
Shock, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 17, 2000, at A31
(noting that the Court has never been truly
“immune to deep ideological divisions
and . . . nonobjective partisan politics”). X
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Op-Editorials Positive Neutral Critical
Debra J. Saunders, Court of Law vs. Court of
Public Opinion, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 13,
2000, at A23 (arguing that the Court
successfully managed to reverse “the
Florida Supreme Court’s activist ruling
. . . without appearing overly activist
itself”). X
Corky Siemaszko, Winners and Losers,
DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Dec. 14, 2000, at 22
(“Led by conservative Justices William
Rehnquist and Antonin Scalia, the court
tarnished its reputation by wading into the
election battle and revealed itself to be as
divided as the rest of the country.”). X
Cynthia Tucker, Voting Rights Not a Done
Deal, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 16, 2000, at A30
(“The five conservatives turned their own
traditional deference to states’ rights on its
head and used civil rights law to
disenfranchise voters.”). X
Don Wycliff, Will We Be Able to Repair the
Damage?, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 14, 2000, at
29N (expressing concern “that the
Supreme Court itself, the one institution
Americans have traditionally looked to as
above the crass political fray, has now
been sucked into the whirlpool”). X
*Written prior to ruling in case, but critical
of predicted 5-4 outcome
Total: 39 8 positive 5 neutral 26 critical
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Addendum C – Law Review Commentary on the Decision in Bush v. Gore
Article Positive Neutral Critical
Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the
Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110
YALE L.J. 1407 (2001) (arguing that Bush v.
Gore was troubling judicial review used to
secure control of the executive branch for
conservatives). X
Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Legal
Historicism and Legal Academics: The
Roles of Law Professors in the Wake of
Bush v. Gore, 90 GEO. L.J. 173 (2001)
(using Bush v. Gore to analyze the role of
legal academia as either “interested
participants” or “disinterested analysts”). X
Steven K. Balman, Bush v. Gore—A
Response to Dean Belsky, 37 TULSA L. REV.
777 (2002) (reviewing Belsky’s critique of
Bush v. Gore and approving of his
substantive exploration of the issues
underlying the case in lieu of a focus on
shrill political criticism). X
Martin H. Belsky, Bush v. Gore—A Critique
of Critiques, 37 TULSA L. REV. 45 (2001)
(analyzing the factual and legal
implications of Bush v. Gore and
concluding that the case blurred the line
between partisanship and the rule of law). X
Steve Bickerstaff, Post-Election Legal
Strategy in Florida: The Anatomy of Defeat
and Victory, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 149
(2002) (arguing that the Court was able to
decide the case without establishing a
precedent involving states’ rights). X
Steve Bickerstaff, Counts, Recounts, and
Election Contests: Lessons from the Florida
Presidential Election, 29 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 425, 467 (2001) (concluding that Bush
v. Gore was “justified under the existing
circumstances”). X
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Article Positive Neutral Critical
Stephen G. Bragaw & Barbara A. Perry, The
‘Brooding Omnipresence’ in Bush v. Gore:
Anthony Kennedy, the Equality Principle,
and Judicial Supremacy, 13 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 19 (2002) (noting the irony of
Bush v. Gore where the most outspoken
activists of states’ rights and judicial
restraint arguably decided against those
principles). X
Richard Briffault, Bush v. Gore as an Equal
Protection Case, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 325
(2001) (examining Bush v. Gore in the
context of the Equal Protection Clause and
noting that the Court was troubled with
local variations in standards, which is
exactly what federalism is supposed to
produce). X
Marshall Camp, Note, Bush v. Gore: Mandate
for Electoral Reform, 58 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 409 (2002) (noting that Bush
v. Gore represents a fundamental
development in equal protection law). X
Paul F. Campos, The Search for
Incontrovertible Visual Evidence, 72 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1039 (2001) (noting that
those upset with Bush v. Gore as
unprincipled were generally happy about
judicial intervention by the Florida
Supreme Court). X
Martin D. Carcieri, Bush v. Gore and Equal
Protection, 53 S.C. L. REV. 63 (2001)
(examining the equal protection precedent
for Bush v. Gore). X
Mary Anne Case, Are Plain Hamburgers Now
Unconstitutional? The Equal Protection
Component of Bush v. Gore as a Chapter in
the History of Ideas about Law, 70 U. CHI.
L. REV. 55 (2003) (attempting to apply the
equal protection holding of Bush v. Gore). X
Erwin Chemerinsky, How Should We Think
About Bush v. Gore?, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1
(2002) (distinguishing the helpful from the
not helpful ways of looking at Bush v.
Gore). X
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Article Positive Neutral Critical
Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not
Justiciable, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1094
(2001) (arguing that the Justices in the
majority abandoned the principles of
judicial restraint, states’ rights, and
restrictive justiciability). X
Jesse H. Choper, Why the Supreme Court
Should Not Have Decided the Presidential
Election of 2000, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 335
(2001) (concluding that judicial
intervention in Bush v. Gore was improper
because it created a popular perception of
partisanship that could diminish confidence
in the Court). X
Michael C. Dorf, The 2000 Presidential
Election: Archetype or Exception?, 99
MICH. L. REV. 1279 (2001) (book review)
(arguing that Bush v. Gore was not a
significant constitutional adjudication
because the justifications that the Court
offered for its decision were unconvincing
and flawed). X
Michael C. Dorf & Samuel Issacharoff, Can
Process Theory Constrain Courts?, 72 U.
COLO. L. REV. 923 (2001) (arguing that the
best constraint on judicial activism is the
political process; if this fails, the legal
academy must hold judges accountable). X
Allison H. Eid, A Spotlight on Structure, 72
U. COLO. L. REV. 911 (2001) (noting that
Bush v. Gore highlights the importance of
legal structure and the Court’s role in that
structure). X
Jonathan L. Entin, Equal Protection, the
Conscientious Judge, and the 2000
Presidential Election, 61 MD. L. REV. 576
(2002) (arguing that although there is a
reasonable argument for the decision in
Bush v. Gore, reasonable people could also
disagree with every aspect of the result). X
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Article Positive Neutral Critical
Richard A. Epstein, ‘In such Manner as the
Legislature Thereof May Direct’: The
Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U.
CHI. L. REV. 613 (2001) (defending the
Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore not on
equal protection grounds but on the grounds
that the Florida Supreme Court violated the
U.S. Constitution Article II, Section 1,
Clause 2). X
Ward Farnsworth, ‘To Do a Great Right, Do a
Little Wrong’: A User’s Guide to Judicial
Lawlessness, 86 MINN. L. REV. 227 (2001)
(arguing that although some cases should
be decided based on extralegal
justifications, Bush v. Gore was not one of
those cases). X
Joel Edan Friedlander, The Rule of Law at
Century’s End, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL’Y 317
(2001) (defending Bush v. Gore as
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause
and conservative jurisprudence). X
Peter Gabel, What it Really Means to Say
‘Law Is Politics’: Political History and
Legal Argument in Bush v. Gore, 67 BROOK.
L. REV. 1141 (2002) (arguing that the recent
triumph of political conservatism shaped
Gore’s legal strategy and ultimately
undermined his case). X
Elizabeth Garrett, Institutional Lessons from
the 2000 Presidential Election, 29 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 975 (2001) (arguing that the
Bush v. Gore decision was a misuse of
unelected judicial power because the
election should have been decided by the
legislative branch). X
Heather K. Gerken, New Wine in Old Bottles:
A Comment on Richard Hasen’s and
Richard Briffault’s Essays on Bush v. Gore,
29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 407 (2001)
(criticizing the Court’s failure to recognize
the value of normative reasoning in Bush v.
Gore as a voting rights case). X
2006] 1465THE LIBERAL LEGACY OF BUSH V. GORE
Article Positive Neutral Critical
Steven G. Gey, The Odd Consequences of
Taking Bush v. Gore Seriously, 29 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1005 (2001) (examining the
consequences of applying the holding in
Bush v. Gore to future cases). X
Howard Gillman, Judicial Independence
Through the Lens of Bush v. Gore: Four
Lessons from Political Science, 64 OHIO ST.
L.J. 249 (2003) (arguing that the Bush v.
Gore decision was deeply flawed and that
political pressures and considerations
played a significant role in the outcome of
the decision). X
Linda Greenhouse, Learning to Live with
Bush v. Gore, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 365 (2001)
(examining the arguments of critics and
supporters of Bush v. Gore and suggesting
that the Court thwarted the democratic
process through its decision). X
Richard L. Hasen, A ‘Tincture of Justice’:
Judge Posner’s Failed Rehabilitation of
Bush v. Gore, 80 TEX. L. REV. 137 (2001)
(book review) (arguing that Posner’s
defense of Bush v. Gore blurs the line
between law and politics and fails to
adequately support his argument that the
decision was defensible as a pragmatic
approach to avoid a constitutional and
political crisis). X
Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the
Future of Equal Protection Law in
Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 377
(2001) (analyzing the potential impact,
costs, and benefits of the Bush v. Gore
decision on voting procedures and
mechanisms). X
Michael Herz, The Supreme Court in Real
Time: Haste, Waste, and Bush v. Gore, 35
AKRON L. REV. 185 (2002) (discussing Bush
v. Gore as an example of the importance of
allowing a time lapse between an event and
judicial consideration of that event to
develop clear jurisprudence). X
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Article Positive Neutral Critical
Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Do Appearances Matter?
Judicial Impartiality and the Supreme
Court in Bush v. Gore, 61 MD. L. REV. 606
(2002) (arguing that the Justices should
have taken more measures to avoid the
appearance of bias). X
Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68
U. CHI. L. REV. 637 (2001) (analyzing the
decision’s effect on the political question
doctrine and concluding that the Court
should have exercised more restraint). X
Robert M. Jarvis, Bush v. Gore: Implications
for Future Federal Court Practice, 76 FLA.
BAR J. 36 (2002) (concluding that the
decision will “lead to a reexamination of
the proper role of the federal courts”). X
Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal: The
Evolution of the Newest Equal Protection
from Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79
N.C. L. REV. 1345 (2001) (arguing that both
cases “re-enlist[] equal protection in the
service of less, rather than greater, equality
and democracy”). X
Pamela S. Karlan, When Freedom Isn’t Free:
The Costs of Judicial Independence in Bush
v. Gore, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 265 (2003)
(arguing that “the Court saw itself as free to
determine the meaning of Florida law for
itself”). X
Pamela S. Karlan, Unduly Partial: The
Supreme Court and the Fourteenth
Amendment in Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 587 (2001) (discussing Peter
Shane’s Disappearing Democracy and
concluding that Bush v. Gore eliminated
due process). X
Evan Tsen Lee, The Politics of Bush v. Gore,
3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 461 (2001)
(criticizing the written opinion, but
concluding that the Justices’ activism may
have been a justifiable response to a
perceived extreme threat to the nation). X
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Nick Levin, Case Note, The Kabuki Mask of
Bush v. Gore, 111 YALE L.J. 223 (2001)
(suggesting that the Court’s expressed
concern with equal protection may have
been a “mask” covering not political
concerns, but rather the Court’s underlying
suspicion of the counting procedures
chosen in Broward County). X
Joseph W. Little, Election Disputes and the
Constitutional Right to Vote, 13 U. FLA.
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 37 (2001) (proposing a
process whereby the results of the first vote
count, even if slightly flawed, determine the
results of the election). X
Nelson Lund, ‘Equal Protection, My Ass!’?
Bush v. Gore and Laurence Tribe’s Hall of
Mirrors, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 543 (2002)
(critiquing as “indefensible” Laurence
Tribe’s article in the Harvard Law Review). X
Nelson Lund, Carnival of Mirrors: Laurence
Tribe’s ‘Unbearable Wrongness’, 19
CONST. COMMENT. 609 (2002) (responding
to Laurence Tribe’s response to the author’s
critique). X
Nelson Lund, The Unbearable Rightness of
Bush v. Gore, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1219
(2002) (defending the decision as
“straightforward and legally correct”). X
William P. Marshall, The Supreme Court,
Bush v. Gore, and Rough Justice, 29 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 787 (2001) (arguing that the
decision lacks doctrinal foundation). X
Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-half
Cheers for Bush v. Gore, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
657 (2001) (pointing out that Gore would
have lost the election even if the Court had
allowed counting to continue, but warning
that the decision “cast long shadows both
on the Court and on the Bush presidency”). X
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Article Positive Neutral Critical
Frank I. Michelman, Suspicion, or the New
Prince, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 679 (2001)
(posing the question of whether the Court
should act as a regent to save the country in
times of national peril; concluding, perhaps
facetiously, that the answer is “not
obvious”). X
Jon L. Mills, Florida on Trial: Federalism in
the 2000 Presidential Election, 13 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 83 (2002) (expressing hope
that the election contest will ultimately lead
to technological and legal improvements). X
Gerald P. Moran, Bush v. Gore: A
Renaissance of Legal Realism, 2 FLA.
COASTAL L.J. 347 (2001) (disagreeing with
the opinion but not viewing it as partisan). X
Michael Louis Newman, Bush v. Gore: What
Happened, and What Does the Supreme
Court’s New Equal Protection Standard
Mean for State Election Officials?, 22 J.
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 153 (2002)
(arguing that although the Court made it
clear that it does not approve of varying
standards for counting votes, it did not
solve the problem of varying standards). X
Helen Norton, What Bush v. Gore Means for
Elections in the 21st Century, 2 WYO. L.
REV. 419 (2002) (arguing that the opinion
creates new litigation opportunities for
addressing flaws in voting practices). X
Spencer Overton, A Place at the Table: Bush
v. Gore Through the Lens of Race, 29 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 469 (2001) (arguing that the
majority’s “limited vision of democracy
inadequately protects the political rights of
racial minorities”). X
W. Glen Pierson, The Role of Federalism in
the Disputed Selection of Presidential
Electors: 1916 & 2000, 22 QUINNIPIAC L.
REV. 283 (2003) (concluding that
federalism was used in the opinion “to
achieve practical, political ends and to solve
real problems arising under the American
Constitutional system”). X
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Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder,
68 U. CHI. L. REV. 695 (2001) (suggesting
that a “cultural conservativism” towards
democracy underlies the opinion, rather
than “narrow partisan politics”). X
Richard H. Pildes, Judging ‘New Law’ in
Election Disputes, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
691 (2001) (arguing that constitutional law
is the “major source for some degree of the
nationalization that one might expect for
determining the ground rules of national
democratic processes”). X
Richard A. Posner, Prolegomenon to an
Assessment, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 719 (2001)
(calling the result “rough justice” but not
deciding whether it represented “legal
justice”). X
H. Jefferson Powell, Overcoming Democracy:
Richard Posner and Bush v. Gore, 17 J. L.
& Pol. 333 (2001) (discussing Judge
Posner’s assessment of the decision). X
George L. Priest, Reanalyzing Bush v. Gore:
Democratic Accountability and Judicial
Overreaching, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 953
(2001) (indicating that the “the principal
criticism [of the Court] is that it has not, to
date, fully explained all that it was taking
into account in its decisions”). X
Barry Richard, In Defense of Two Supreme
Courts, 13 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1
(2001) (arguing that the Court played its
role in the election process as dictated by
the Constitution). X
Glory Ross, Comment, Constitutional Law:
Protecting Equal Protection: Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. 98 (2000), 13 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 173 (2001) (calling Bush v. Gore
“the most significant voting rights case in
recent history”). X
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Ronald D. Rotunda, Yet Another Article on
Bush v. Gore, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 283 (2003)
(arguing that seven of the Justices in Bush
v. Gore concluded that the Florida State
Supreme Court acted unconstitutionally and
rejecting the additional justifications given
by three Justices). X
Edmund S. Sauer, Note, “Arbitrary and
Disparate” Obstacles to Democracy: The
Equal Protection Implications of Bush v.
Gore on Election Administration, 19 J.L. &
POL. 299 (2003) (arguing that Bush v. Gore
could be used to support other equal
protection claims against local government
voting practices). X
Robert A. Schapiro, Article II as Interpretive
Theory: Bush v. Gore and the Retreat from
Erie, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 89 (2002)
(analyzing the concurrence as congruent
with “the Rehnquist Court’s assault on
certain aspects of the post New Deal
constitutional order”). X
Roy A. Schotland, In Bush v. Gore: Whatever
Happened to the Due Process Ground?, 34
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 211 (2002) (submitting
that the Court should have decided the case
on due process grounds based on issues
with the “intent of the voter” standard and
potential abuse by the canvassing boards). X
Peter M. Shane, Disappearing Democracy:
How Bush v. Gore Undermined the Federal
Right to Vote for Presidential Electors, 29
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 535 (2001) (arguing
that the Court disregarded the democratic
nature of the Constitution and the nation’s
political history in declaring that a state has
the authority to disenfranchise its voters). X
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David A. Strauss, What Were They Thinking?,
68 U. CHI. L. REV. 737 (2001) (charging
that a majority of the Court approached the
case having already decided the outcome
and searched for some justification to
prevent the perceived greater evil of the
Florida Supreme Court acting improperly to
influence the election). X
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